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A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF "YIELD SWITCHING" FRAUD 
IN THE FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
 
Federal crop insurance is a core component of U.S. agricultural policy. From its 
inception, however, policy makers have struggled with two persistent problems: (1) 
higher than desired loss ratios and the resulting federal expenditures, and (2) lower than 
desired producer participation despite federal subsidies as high as 67 percent of some 
producer's premium costs (Goodwin and Smith). The persistence of higher than desired 
loss ratios and lower than desired producer participation have commonly been attributed 
to adverse selection and moral hazard (Chambers; Coble et. al.; Goodwin and Smith; Just, 
Calvin, and Quiggen; Makki and Somwaru; Skees and Reed; Quiggen, Karagiannis, and 
Stanton; Vercammen and van Kooten).  Fraud has received less attention in the federal 
crop insurance literature although it is a common theme in the general insurance literature 
(Artis, Ayuso, and Guillen; Dionne; Brockett, Xia, and Derring; Picard, 1996, 2000).  
Fraudulent activity may also be increasing loss ratios and leading to higher premium 
rates
1 and a corresponding decrease in participation rates (USDA, Office of the Inspector 
General; General Accounting Office).  
Estimating the costs of fraudulent conduct is difficult because accurately 
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate indemnifications requires extensive 
on-site investigation.  Statistically differentiating between legitimate indemnifications 
and fraud is a difficult identification problem similar to problems encountered when 
attempting to differentiate between environmentally induced losses, adverse selection, 
and moral hazard (Chiappori; Dionne; Quiggin et. al.)
2.  In this paper we present a 
statistical model that tests for one type of fraudulent conduct - switching reported yields 
between separately insured tracts of land.  The statistical model tests for a specific type of   2
dynamic yield reporting that is consistent with fraudulent conduct but is unlikely to have 
occurred with honest reporting.   
RMA provisions define two categories of separately insurable units - basic units 
and optional units.  A producer may separately insure two or more units as basic units if 
the producer farms the land but each tract is owned by (and the indemnities shared with) 
an entity different from the producer.  Examples of basic units include land rented under 
a crop share arrangement with different landlords. Optional units are tracts that satisfy 
certain spatial requirements, are controlled by one producer, and the producer entity 
retains a 100 percent share of any indemnifications.  Examples include land owned by the 
producer as well as any tracts under a cash rent arrangement.  The interested reader is 
referred Knight and Coble for additional definitions, details and comparisons between 
basic and optional units.   
The fraud examined in this paper involves switching reported yields between 
separately insured tracts or units of land under the control of a single producer.  The 
possibility of this type of fraud has been discussed in several governmental studies. Both 
the USDA inspector general and GAO reports explicitly raise the issue of potential 
abuses of the optional unit provisions of the current crop insurance program. Producers 
may exploit optional unit provisions by manipulating "their unit structure to benefit 
themselves when determining if losses actually occurred" (USDA, Office of the Inspector 
general).
3  Knight and Coble; Kuhling; and Atwood, Watts, and Shaik found that loss 
cost ratios (indemnifications divided by liability exposure) were higher for optionally 
insured units than for basic units with similar characteristics and of similar size. While 
the higher LCR's are not necessarily indicative of misconduct, RMA's current rate   3
structure recognizes the higher loss cost ratio (LCR) and incorporates a ten percent 
surcharge for optionally insured units.
4  
Among other problems with optional unit provisions, the USDA Office of the 
Inspector General report indicated that audits of actual producer losses found producers 
who were not able to provide adequate records that "showed from which optional units 
the production actually was harvested". As we demonstrate below, the inability of crop 
adjusters to accurately tie production to specific tracts of land provides strong incentives 
for some producers to switch reported production between various tracts of land and 
generate additional fraudulent indemnifications.  Atwood, Watts, and Shaik provide 
anecdotal support for potential yield switching gains.   
In this study we expand Atwood et. al's results by presenting a statistical test of 
potential yield switching that is applied to reported yield histories from 206,952 
producers.   Procedures are presented that allow identification of:  (1) farms whose 
reported yields are consistent with yield-switching;  (2) an estimate of the prevalence of 
yield switching in the total population; and (3) an estimate of the aggregate cost of yield 
switching in the population.  The paper concludes with a summary and recommendations 
for further research.      
A Model of Yield Switching 
We assume that a producer grows an insurable crop on each of U separately insurable 
tracts or units of land.  Let   u a denote the acres of the crop in unit u (u =1,2,…,U) and 
u,t y the per-acre yields for unit u as reported to the insurance company in year t.  On each 
unit the producer is allowed to insure a proportion K (from 50 to 85 percent)
5 of the 
unit’s year-t Approved Production History ( u, t APH ) computed as a four-to-ten year   4
moving average of previously reported yields.  Assuming the producer reports T years of 
historical data, unit u’s APH at the beginning of year t is computed as: 
                 
t-1
1
u, tu, i T
i = t-T
APHy(1) = ￿      
  At the end of the year, the producer realizes the actual production and reports 
yields  u,t y  to the insurance company
6.  If  u,t y  is less than  u, t K APH ￿ for any u, a crop 
adjustor visits the farm and attempts to determine if there are any discrepancies in the 
reported yields.  Adjustment procedures may include field examinations, measurements 
of stored production, examinations of sales receipts, and/or contacting marketing 
establishments within a reasonable transportation distance. If the total production 
identified during the adjustment process equals the total reported production 
( tuu, t
u
TRPay =￿ ), and the adjustor finds no substantial evidence of inaccuracies in 
reported  u,t y , the producer receives an indemnity of  uu,tu, t a(K  APH  -  y) ￿ on each unit 
for which  u,t y  is less than u,t (K  APH) ￿ .  In the following we assume that the producer's 
total reported production TRPt equals the total production potentially identifiable by an 
adjustor. 
  Let  u, t z  be the actual (and unobserved) per-acre production from unit u that is 
included in TRPt giving:
7   
        tuu, tuu, t
uu
TRPazay                                                                      (2) == ￿￿  
Assume that, at the end of year t,  u,tu,t z exceed (K  APH) ￿  for all u and no legitimate 
indemnifications are forthcoming.  The producer realizes that, while the adjustor can   5
determine  tuu, t
u
TRPaz = ￿ with relative accuracy (due to total receipts, inventories, 
etc.), conclusive verification of differences between  1, t2, tU, t z, z,..., z is much more 
difficult.  Assume that the producer is willing to illicitly enhance indemnification by 
manipulating reported yields.  The manipulated reported yields can be expressed as:
8  
                u, tu, tu, t y =  z  +                                                                                            (3)    D   
subject to: 
                 tuu, tuu, t
uu
TRPa y a z          for t = 1, ... , T                                 (4) == ￿￿   
where  u, t D  denotes the difference between reported and actual per-acre yields on unit u 
in year t.  If  u, t D > 0 ( u, t D < 0), unit u’s reported yield in year t has been artificially 
inflated (deflated) relative to the actual  u, t z .  Expressions (3) and (4) can be rearranged 
allowing (4) to be replaced with an equivalent set of restrictions: 
                  uu, t
u
a   =  0          for t = 1, ..., T                                                              (5) D ￿  
 
Figure 1 graphically demonstrates the producer's yield switching incentives.  The 
first panel of figure 1 plots year-t total cotton indemnities (in pounds of cotton) as a 
function of  1, t D  assuming U = 2,  a1 =  a2 = 1,  K =  .75,   1, t (K  APH) ￿  = 900, 
2, t (K  APH) ￿  = 750,  1, t z  = 950 and  2, t z = 850.  With honest reporting  1, t D = 0,  1, t y  =  
950,   2, t y  =  850 and total indemnities INDEMt = 0.  If 200 pounds of reported 
production are “switched” from unit 1 to unit 2,      ( 1, t D = -200,  1, t y  = 750 and  2, t y  = 
1000), total indemnities equal 150 (900-750) pounds on unit 1 and none on unit 2.  If   6
1, t D = 200 ( 1, t y  = 1150 and  2, t y  = 650) total indemnities equal 100 (750-650) pounds on 
unit two and none on unit one.  Shifting all reported production from unit 1 to unit 2 
( 1, t D = -950,  1, t y  = 0 and  2, t y  = 1800) generates 900 or  1, t (K  APH) ￿  pounds of 
indemnities. Shifting all production from unit 2 onto unit 1 ( 1, t D = 850,  1, t y  = 1800 and 
2, t y  = 0) generates 750 or  2, t (K  APH) ￿  pounds of total indemnities.  
  If the probability of detection is zero or remains low for all possible  1, t D values, a 
myopic producer maximizes year-t indemnities with “all-or-nothing” yield switching 
1, t D = 950.  If the probability of detection increases with | 1, t D |, the optimal yield 
switching decision will often involve “partial” yield switching.  The first panel of figure 1 
also plots net-indemnities less expected agency imposed fraud fines. The plot assumes 
that the probability of detection increases linearly from 0 (when  1, t D  = 0) to .5 (when 
| 1, t D * = 950) and the fraud fine (if detected) is twice the amount of the fraudulent 
indemnification. With these assumptions, the myopic optimal  1, t D  level is -500 (partial 
yield switching) with illicit indemnities of 450 and a 26.3 % probability of detection.  In 
both cases, the optimal myopic yield switching rule involves switching reported 
production from the unit with the higher APH (unit 1) to the unit with the lower APH 
(unit 2). 
  The expression “myopic” is used in the preceding paragraph because the 
producer’s “optimal” solution did not consider the dynamic effects of year-t yield 
switching upon future yield switching incentives.  Since the APH is a T-year moving 
average of previously reported yields,  1, t D  will influence both year t indemnities and 
APH values in years t+1, t+2, ... t+T.      7
The second panel of figure 1, plots year t +1 indemnity responses to  1, t+1 D  
assuming that APH 1,t + 1 decreases to 750 and APH 2,t+1 increases to 900.  Realized  1, t+1 z  
and  2, t+1 z are assumed to equal 950 and 850 respectively.  Once again, the optimal 
myopic policy involves switching production from the highest APH unit (unit 2) to the 
lowest APH unit (unit 1).  Shifting 850 pounds of reported production from unit 2 to unit 
1 ( 1, t+1 D = 850) generates a maximal indemnity of 900 if the probability of detection is 
low.  Simulations
9 indicate that the “switch all production from high APH to low APH 
units” rule dominates honest reporting if the probabilities of detection are low. If the 
probability of detection increases with the severity of the yield switching, partial yield 
switching dominates all-or-nothing yield switching. 
  Dynamically switching yields from higher APH units to lower APH units 
generates higher indemnity payments and oscillating reported yield patterns caused by a 
given unit's “receiving” production in some years and “donating” production in other 
years.  Within a given year, some of the farm’s units will have inflated yields while other 
units will have deflated yields with the patterns being reversed in different years.  For a 
two-unit farm, plots of predicted  u, t y  are similar to figure 2, which plots the reported 
yields of an actual two-unit cotton producer.  The oscillating and negatively correlated 
yield pattern in figure 2 was “flagged” as statistically significant using the procedures 
presented in the following paragraphs. We return to this farm in upcoming examples. 
A Statistical Model of Yield Switching 
We next develop a statistical model that identifies possible yield switching.  We first 
assume that the conditional expected value of the unobserved actual  u, t z  is proportional   8
to realized county yields in year t with: 
                  u, ttu,t zC + e                                                                                            (6) u g =  
where  u g  is a “unit - u” expected yield multiplier,  t C  are county or regional average 
yields in year t, and  u, t e  is a residual.  Substituting expression (6) into (3) gives: 
                  u, ttu, tu,t yC +  +  e                                                                                (7) u g =D  
 subject to: 
                  uu, t
u
a   =  0                                                                                               (8) D ￿  
Systems (7) and (8) can be viewed as testing whether the reported yield series  u, t y  are 
statistically different from any yield series u, t z , with the same total reported production in 
year t, that could reasonably be expected from process (6). In the following discussion we 
will also refer to system (7) using the common notation 
                y = X + e                                                                                                     (9)  b  
where  1,11,T2,12,TU,1U,T y = (y,...y,y...y,..., y...y) ¢ , X is a corresponding design matrix, 
121,11,2,12,,1, (,,...,,...,,...,,...,,...,) UTTUUT bggg ¢=DDDDDD  is a vector of parameters, and 
eis a vector of corresponding residuals.  
Within each farm in a given county or region, the error structure is assumed to 
satisfy:  
22
u,t (e) t E s =  
u,sv,t (ee) = 0 for all u and v when st E „                                                                        (10) 
2
u,sv,tt (ee) =   for all u  v when s = t E rs „     9
with the 
2 and  t sr  values assumed common to all farms with an equivalent number of 
units in the county-region.
10   
   In the absence of restrictions (8), system (7) or (9) is over-parameterized (under-
identified) with U + UT parameters and only UT observations.  The T restrictions in (8), 
while linearly independent of each other, can be shown to be insufficient to allow the 
identifiably of the system.  We next present a brief review of the two main statistical 
approaches to the over-parameterized problem.  We then discuss the identifiability 
problem with restrictions (8) and present an additional set of constraints that, with (8), 
enable identifiably. 
Statistical Approaches to the Over-parameterized Problem 
  System (7) or (9) is a special case of a more general set of over-parameterized 
statistical problems in which the () XX ¢ matrix is singular and the normal equations 
() XXXy b ¢¢ =  have an infinite number of solutions  b .  Examples include the classical 
ANOVA model and the dummy variable problem discussed by Suits and Greene and 
Seaks.  The statistical difficulty introduced by over-parameterized linear models is that 
the function  r b ¢ %  is not uniquely identified for all combinations of  r  and  b % .  The 
statistics literature addresses this problem in two ways, each of which utilizes restrictions. 
  The first approach (Rao; Searle) restricts the set of testable hypotheses  r  to the 
set of "estimable"  r % for withr b ¢ % %  is invariant for all normal equation solutions  b % .  The 
estimable restrictions approach involves the use of an arbitrary generalized inverse 
() XX
- ¢  to find “a” solution  () XXXy b
- ¢¢ = % to the normal equations and then 
performing hypothesis tests on estimable restrictions. See Searle and Chipman for   10
numerous results with respect to the estimable restrictions approach.  Two results that we 
use below are (a) a restriction  r b ¢ % %  is estimable if and only if  r¢ %  lies in the row space of 
X (or equivalently the column space of () XX ¢ ) and (b) only estimable restrictions or 
linear combinations of estimable and non estimable restrictions can influence the SSE of 
the regression models. 
The second approach to the over-parameterized problem works well with 
restrictions like (8).  This approach involves restricting the  b -space sufficiently so as to 
allow the constrained system to become invertible (Searle; Johns; Chipman; Green-
Seaks).  Examples of this approach include the arbitrary deletion of dummy variables or 
the imposition of more easily interpretable restrictions (Green and Seaks).  Green and 
Seaks’ procedure involves the identification of a sufficient set of non-estimable 
restrictions to allow invertibility of the lagrangian (l ) augmented (LAUG) system: 
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Searle; Johns; Chipman; and Green-Seaks present numerous generalized inverse 
results with respect to systems (11) and (12) including the results that () XX ¢  is a 
generalized inverse of G11 and G11 is related 
11 to the variance-covariance matrix of  ˆ
R b .  
If  () XX ¢  is rank deficient of order p and expression (11) is constructed with exactly p 
non-estimable constraints, G11 is also a generalized inverse of  () XX ¢ , G22 = 0, and the   11
lagrangians  ˆ
R l  equal 0.  Additional results with respect to systems (11) and (12) are 
available from the authors. 
  Deriving an invertible LAUG matrix requires identifying p linearly independent 
“X nonestimable” restrictions.  In addition, (Searle) the non-estimable restrictions must 
be simultaneously independent of the rows of X’X and the other rows of R.  In the 
following, we denote restrictions that cannot be expressed as linear combinations of the 
rows of (X’X) and the other rows of R as being “system non-estimable”.  By definition, 
system non-estimable restrictions are linearly independent of the other rows of R and are 
also X non-estimable.  However, individual restrictions may be both linearly independent 
of other restrictions in R and X non-estimable and yet be system estimable.  All X 
estimable restrictions are system estimable. 
  The importance in identifying the number of “system estimable” restrictions in 
the LAUG system is two-fold.  First, if (X’X) is rank deficient of order p, we must 
identify p system non-estimable restrictions if the LAUG system is to be invertible.  
Secondly, when additional hypothesis testing restrictions are imposed on a LAUG system 
with a singular (X’X), degrees of freedom adjustments in the hypotheses tests involve 
differences in the rank of basis sets for the two system's estimable restrictions not 
necessarily the difference in the total number of restrictions between the two systems.  
Additional results are available from the authors. 
Identifiably Restrictions for the YS Model 
The (X’X) matrix of system (11) can be shown to be rank deficient of order U.  When the 
T restrictions of (8) are imposed simultaneously, it is easily verified that: (i) any (T-1) of 
the restrictions can be written as a linear combination of the rows of X'X and the   12
remaining restriction and (ii) the LAUG system remains rank deficient of order (U-1). As 
a result, it is necessary to identify U-1 additional system non-estimable restrictions to 
obtain an invertible LAUG matrix. 
  An additional set of economically interpretable restrictions is suggested by the 
dynamic characteristics of yield switching.  If the “switch reported production from high 
APH to lower APH unit” rule is followed dynamically, a given unit u will have  u, t D > 0 
in some years and  u, t D < 0 in other years as the unit’s reported yields are cyclically 
“inflated” and “deflated” by yield switching.  Our second set of restrictions limits a given 
unit's  u, t
ˆ D estimates to levels that are offset by  u, s
ˆ D estimates of opposite sign within the 
sample period.  The restrictions can be written as: 
            u, t ˆ 0                for u = 1, ..., U-1                                                              (13)  
t
D= ￿  
Each of the U-1 restrictions
12 in (13) can be shown to be system non-estimable when 
imposed simultaneously with the T restrictions of (8) and the resulting LAUG system is 
invertible.   
If the restrictions in (13) are not strictly satisfied within the given sample period, 
individual  u, t
ˆ D estimates can be shown to be biased.  However, since restrictions (13) are 
system non-estimable, (i) the SSE of the LAUG system does not depend upon the right 
hand sides in (13) and (ii) significance tests for the joint hypotheses that  u, t
ˆ D = 0 (for all u 
and t) do not depend upon restrictions (13) being exactly satisfied. Restrictions (13) are, 
in effect, serving the purpose of the identifiability constraints utilized by Greene and 
Seaks. We demonstrate that restrictions (13) do not affect the SSE in the appendix. 
  In the next section, we apply the LAUG yield-switching model to yield data from   13
two insured Southeastern cotton farms including the farm whose yields are plotted in 
figure 2.  We then apply the model to reported yield data from 206,952 insured producers 
of six crops and estimate the incidence of yield switching in the insured population. 
 
  An Empirical Application of the Yield Switching Model 
In this section we apply the statistical model to reported yield data obtained from RMA’s 
public web site.  The data consists of four-to-ten years of unit level reported yields for all 
producers who purchased barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, soybean, or wheat 
insurance in the 1998 crop year.  The procedures described below were individually 
applied to all farms and units with at least four years of valid
13 yield data (per unit) on 
two or more units.   The example focuses on the two-unit producer whose yields were 
plotted in figure 2 and a second producer from the same county.  Table 1 presents 
information employed in testing the farms for yield switching and a summary of the 
results. Numerical matrices and other results are presented in the appendix. The steps and 
assumptions involved in the estimation are described below. 
Assumptions and Procedures In the Estimation Process. 
The regression model for each multiple unit farm can be summarized as: 
                 u, ttu, tu,t yC +  +  e                                                                                (14) u g =D  
subject to: 
                  uu, t
u
a   =  0                       for t = 1, ..., T                                                 (15) D ￿  
and  
                 u, t
t
   =  0                            for u = 1, ..., U-1                                            (16) D ￿  
with the error structure assumptions (10).  The  t C , 
2
t s , and  r  values were estimated   14
from the RMA population of single and multiple unit producers in the producers’ county-
region.  For each given county, contiguous counties were pooled until there were at least 
100 single-unit farms in the given county’s “county-region”
14. “County-region” yields Ct 
were averaged across all reported yields in year t. 
Annual residual variances 
2
t s  were computed by year using pooled residuals from 
all single unit producers in the county-region. Single unit farm residuals were obtained by 
applying a three-stage GLS procedure to the following model
15:   
         
fff
ttt y =  C e                                                                                              (17)    g +  
where f denotes farm f.  The county average within-farm unit correlation  r  was 
computed by applying GLS (with a diagonal variance matrix using the 
2
t s  values from 
the single unit farms) to estimate a “no-switching” model:  
                  
ff
u, ttu, t y =  C e                                                                                         (18)   
f
u g +  
for each multiple unit farm in the county-region. Within each farm f, pair-wise unit 
residual correlations 
  f
u, v ˆ r  were computed for all pairs of units u and v.  The farm’s 
average ‘unit-pair” correlation  ˆ
f r  was calculated and the county-region average 






rr = ￿ where  M F  denotes the number of multiple unit 
farms in the county region.  
Testing the Example Farms for Yield Switching 
  Table 1 presents four years of 
f2
u, ttt y , C ,  ,   s and the residual covariance terms 
for two producers who reported yields in the same years.  The first column of yield data   15
lists the first four years
16 of reported yield data from the producer in figure 2. The second 
column of yield data lists the same year’s reported yields from a different producer in the 
county
17.  Table 1 also presents the GLS-scaled  SW SSE , the likelihood ratio (LRT) 
statistics and the p-values derived from the "fully restricted" non yield-switching (NSW) 
model (18) and the "partially restricted" yield-switching (SW) model (14-16) – (see the 
appendix for numerical computation examples).  
 
  Noting that the fully restricted no-switching model (18) is nested in the partially 
restricted yield-switching model (14-16), we utilize the population variance-covariance 
structure S  in a likelihood ratio test based on the difference between SSENSW and SSESW. 
If the residual vector  eis approximately Normal(0, S ) with known  S , the following 
statistic is approximately 
2() r c  where r is the difference in the rank of basis sets for the 
estimable restrictions in the two models: 
             
112
NSWSW NSW NSW SW SW ˆˆˆˆ SSE- SSE=  (e)(e) (e)(e)()                  (19) r c
-- ¢¢ S-S :  
Expression (19) can be shown to be equivalent to a likelihood ratio test (LRT) statistic 
and we refer to the statistic as the LRT statistic. 
  In practice, expression (19) is often of limited use in that S  is usually unknown 
and must be estimated using an individual’s sample data.  If we had data from only one 
producer, estimates of S  would be questionable due to the low degrees of freedom in 
system (14-16). The usual approach of estimating the variance from the sample residuals 
and utilizing an F-test is problematic when the denominator degrees of freedom is low 
relative to the number of parameters being estimated. In the restricted system (14-16) 
there are only T-1 degrees of freedom regardless of the number of units U.  In Monte   16
Carlo simulations we found that traditional F-tests developed with the individual 
producer’s data had low power and did not reliably identify simulated yield switching.  
However, in this study, we have a substantial amount of additional information 
from the population of producers. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that estimating  S  
directly from the population of insured producers results in more powerful tests of yield 
switching as contrasted to using an F-test if the small sample SSE of the farm is used in 
the denominator of the F-statistic. Alternatively, if the population residual variance is 
used in the denominator of the F-statistic, the results are equivalent to the LRT test in 
(19).  The degrees of freedom r for the LRT statistic can be shown to be: 
                
 = U T - T - U + 1                                                                                         (20)    r  
The first farm’s LRT statistic is 46.67 with (8-4-2+1) or 3 degrees of freedom giving a p-
value of 0.000.  We do not interpret these p-values as exact because normality is 
questionable and sample sizes are small. However a low p-value is strong evidence 
against the null hypothesis that the first farm's reported yield pattern occurred randomly, 
given county yields  t C  and variance-covariance structure S .     
The second farm’s unit level yields are more closely related to the county yields 
and do not exhibit the oscillatory pattern show in figure 2. The farm's full sample LRT 
statistic is 2.25 with 3 degrees of freedom giving a p-value of 0.522 implying that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the second farm's yield series could have occurred 
randomly.      
The third column of yield data in table 1 is presented to demonstrate a potential 
Type I error problem that we observed when applying the model to the population of   17
multiple unit producers.  The LRT was initially individually applied to the reported yield 
data from 206,952 multiple unit producers of six crops.  We then visually examined plots 
of reported yields for all farms with LRT p-values < .01.  We noted that a number of the 
low p-value farms exhibited no visible signs of oscillating yields and had one of more 
units with a very low yield in one year.  To examine the sensitivity of the LRT statistic to 
isolated low yield events
18, we constructed multiple Monte Carlo simulations with 
various error distributions and correlation structures
19. 
  If the Monte Carlo error structure is normal with no yield switching, the empirical 
distribution of the LRT p-values is approximately uniformly distributed over the [0-1] 
interval.  If the correlation structure is improperly specified, the resulting p-values are 
biased toward 1 (0) if the statistical model’s  ˆ r  is less than (greater than) the actual  r  
used to generate the data. Monte Carlo samples were also generated with the population’s 
residual 
2
t s  and  r  varying from producer to producer.  The simulations indicate utilizing 
population average
2
t s  and  r  values produces more robust Type I - Type II error rates as 
contrasted to estimating small sample farm-specific 
2
t s  and  r  values. 
  With “long-tailed” distributions or with simulated low probability “hail events”, 
many honest simulated producers whose simulated yields contained an isolated low yield 
event had low LRT p-values that resulted in Type 1 errors.  To examine the incidence of 
Type 1 – Type 2 error rates, we also constructed simulations in which ten-percent of the 
simulated population switched yields.  While the LRT test identified a significant 
proportion of the yield-switching group, the test also improperly categorized a number of 
the “honest-but-hailed” producers as potential yield-switchers. 
  Given that many of the Type I errors were caused by a single isolated low yield   18
event, we examined the applicability of a jack-knifed test similar to the intersection-union 
tests discussed by Berger and Hsu.  The following jack-knife test was applied to each 
simulated producer.  For each year t = 1,2, …T, LRTt and p-valuet were estimated while 
deleting year t’s data from the regressions.  Let  t t J-MAX = max (p-value). A “small” J-
MAX indicates that the results are not sensitive to events in any single year
20 and is 
evidence against the null hypothesis of no yield switching. If a producer’s J-MAX 
exceeds some critical value the low LRT p-value was caused by an event that occurred in 
one year
21.  In the Monte Carlo simulations, setting the critical value for J-MAX at 0.10 
gave robust Type I-Type II error results with roughly equal numbers of Type I –Type II 
error counts.  Given that we desire to estimate the incidence of yield switching in the 
population, we use 0.10 as the critical value for J-MAX.    
The lower schedule in Table 1 presents the results of applying the jack-knife 
procedure to the two example farms. For the first farm, the LRT p-values remain low 
(0.000) when data from each of years 1, 2, 3, and 4 are sequentially deleted from the 
analysis. The maximum of these values (J-MAX = 0.000) is below 0.10 and we conclude 
that the first farm's low LRT p-value was not caused by a single year's yield events.  The 
second farm's higher LRT p-value (0.522) and J-MAX (0.613) both indicate that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the second farm’s yield variability is random. 
The third set of yield data demonstrates the LRT model's sensitivity to a single 
low yield event.  The third "farm's" yields are equivalent to the second farm's yields with 
the exception that  1,2 y  has been reduced from 690 pounds to 250 pounds per acre. With 
the reduction of only one year's yields, the farm's LRT statistic increases from 2.06 to 
11.4 reducing the p-value from .522 to .010.  The jack-knifed p-values are 0.014, 0.330,   19
0.031, and .003 when years one, two, three and four are respectively deleted from the 
analysis giving a J-MAX of 0.330.  Since J-MAX exceeds 0.10 we conclude that the 
original low p-value resulted from a single year event and not from a consistent cyclical 
pattern of yield switching.                 
Estimates of Yield Switching Incidence and Costs in the General Population 
  The results of applying the yield switching tests to 206,952 of barley, cotton, 
grain sorghum, corn, soybeans and wheat are summarized in tables 2 and 3.  Due to space 
limitations, each table only presents results from states with 500 or more multiple unit 
producers reporting at least four years of non-replicated reported yields on each unit. 
Only years for which yields were reported on two or more units were included in the 
farm’s analysis.  The tables also present total values aggregated over all states with 100 
or more multiple unit producers.  
The first five columns list the state, the total number of screened farms, the 
number of farms “flagged” with a 1 % likelihood ratio test (LRT), the number of farms 
with J-MAX less than 0.10, and the proportion of farms flagged with the jack-knifed J-
MAX statistic. As previously indicated, the J-MAX statistic flags substantially fewer 
farms than the 1% LRT as a result of the LRT’s sensitivity to single year events.  The 
proportion of farms flagged with the J-MAX statistic varies by state and crop with values 
as low as 2.3 percent in Nebraska grain sorghum to as high as 13.7 percent in Alabama 
cotton.  The estimated incidence rate varies by crop from 3.4 percent in grain sorghum to 
6.1 percent in cotton.  The overall incidence rate across all six crops is estimated at 10256 
of 206,952 producers or about 5 percent. 
Figure 3 plots the reported yields from six producers flagged as statistically   20
suspicious.  The plots demonstrate the yield switching model’s predicted oscillating 
patterns of high reported yields on some units with concurrently low yields on other units 
with the patterns being reversed in subsequent years. We visually examined the plots of 
all “J-MAX flagged” farms and usually observed visually apparent oscillatory patterns of 
concurrently high and low yields. 
The statistical model identified farms with suspicious yield patterns that were 
unlikely to have occurred randomly given the local yield events reflected in  t C  and  C S .  
Behaviorally, if the low J-MAX producers were enhancing indemnities by yield 
switching, a Rothschild-Stiglitz type model predicts that the low J-MAX producers will 
elect higher insurance coverage. To test this prediction, we pooled the producers by state 
and regressed their individual coverage elections
22 on J-MAX. The fifth column of tables 
2 and 3 present the estimated regression parameter from the pooled regressions. For the 
larger states, the parameter estimates are usually negative and statistically significant 
indicating that lower J-MAX producers tend to elect higher coverage. Across all 67 state-
crop combinations examined, 58 regression parameter estimates were negative with 35 
significant at the 10% level or lower. Two of the nine positive estimates were statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  The regression results support the hypothesis that the lower 
J-MAX producers are electing higher coverage, possibly in anticipation of higher 
indemnities from yield switching. 
Estimates of the Costs of Yield Switching 
  The final two columns in tables 2 and 3 present our estimates of program costs of 
yield switching in the 1993-1997 period. We first downloaded 1993-1997 historical state-
crop level liability and indemnification amounts from the RMA’s online summary of   21
business. However, RMA’s summary of business does not provide coverage level and 
single-multiple unit breakdowns of the data. Using procedures similar to those described 
in Atwood, et.al., we simulated 1993-1997 coverage level, multiple unit, and flagged-
nonflagged liability and loss shares using RMA’s 1998 online yield histories
23.  Applying 
the estimated shares to the online -summary of business totals allowed us to estimate the 
total amount of liability for flagged versus non-flagged farms by coverage level. 
Multiplying this amount by the difference in simulated loss cost ratios (indemnities 
divided by liability exposure) of the flagged versus non-flagged farms and aggregating 
across coverage levels generates the values in tables 2 and 3.    
  The estimated five-year costs of detected yield switching totaled $ 
121,720,000 for the states and crops examined.  For individual crops, the estimated costs 
are $1,975,000 for barley, $ 16,116,000 in cotton, $556,000 for grain sorghum, $ 
43,671,000 in corn, $29,774,000 for soybeans, and $ 29,619,000 for wheat. During this 
period estimated yield switching costs amount to about three percent of total 
indemnifications. This amount varies by crop (from .4 percent in grain sorghum to over 
five percent in soybeans) and by state (over eight percent in several soybean states).    
The estimated costs of yield switching in tables 2 and 3 are lower than RMA's 
current surcharge (10%) associated with insuring optional units. However, the incidence 
and costs of yield switching as reported in tables 1 and 2 should be interpreted cautiously. 
A reviewer questioned why the incidence rates would differ in different locations. One 
possibility is that detection of yield switching fraud is more statistically difficult in areas, 
such as the high plains, with higher underlying yield variability. In these areas, estimated 
variances
2
t s  are proportionally higher - possibly resulting in fewer farms being flagged   22
as statistically suspicious. In these areas it is likely that we have underestimated the 
incidence of yield switching.  
Unpublished research by one of the authors (for the RMA) has also shown that 
different forms of apparent abuse are more common in some geographic regions than in 
others and also differ across time.  For example, when examined intertemporally, it 
appears that once a given type of questionable conduct has gone undetected in a given 
year, the local incidence of the conduct increases in later years.  The pattern of “learned” 
yield-switching conduct is especially evident in some of the southeastern cotton states 
where we estimate a higher yield-switching incidence.  We suspect that, in other regions, 
different methods of “indemnification enhancement” are the method of choice resulting 
in lower estimates of yield switching incidence.  It is probable that both yield switching 
and other types of fraud are more prevalent than indicated in tables 1 and 2. In this study 
we were not able to examine the extent of yield switching between singly insured units 
controlled by related parties nor were we able to examine the extent of yield switching 
for the large number of producers who fail to submit a complete and accurate historical 
yield history.     
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper demonstrated that multiple unit crop insurance provisions provide incentives 
for some producers to consider switching yields between separately insured tracts of land 
so as to generate larger insurance indemnifications. Statistical procedures were developed 
to identify producers whose reported yield patterns are consistent with the predictions of 
a model of yield-switching model. Estimates of yield switching incidence in the 
population range from two to over thirteen percent of the population in some states.  In   23
some states, yield-switching indemnifications were estimated to amount to as much as 
eight percent of total indemnifications received by all multiple unit producers.        
  There are problems with the interpretation of the results of this study.  The 
statistical procedures used are not intended by the authors to be viewed as proof of 
fraudulent conduct on the part of any individual or group of insurees.  Proof of illicit 
conduct requires detailed and careful on-site investigation.  However, we believe that the 
procedures presented in this paper can provide a useful screening device by more 
efficiently focusing the efforts of crop adjustors and agency compliance personnel on the 
smaller subset of the population who are more likely to have participated in suspicious 
conduct. 
  The procedures presented in this paper do, however, provide evidence that an 
abnormally high number of producers report yields that are consistent with yield 
switching.  As there are undoubtedly other types of undetected fraudulent activities 
present in the insured population, the results presented in this paper could be viewed as 
lower bound estimates of the prevalence and cost of crop insurance fraud.      
      
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1  The RMA periodically adjusts premium rates to incorporate recent loss information. As a result 
fraudulent indemnifications eventually lead to higher net premiums for producers as well as higher 
taxpayer subsidization costs. 
 
2 Chiappori and Dionne state that differentiating between moral hazard and adverse selection is difficult but 
may be facilitated with the identification of moral hazard conduct consistent with testable predictions from 
dynamic economic models.  In following paragraphs, we present an intuitive discussion of a dynamic 
economic model that predicts cyclical patterns of reported yields generated by yield switching fraud. The 
model is similar to Vercammen and van Kooten's model of moral hazard cycles. Space prevents a detailed 
discussion of the model. A more thorough discussion of the model and it's predictions is available from the 
authors         
   24
                                                                                                                                                 
3  The report estimated that taxpayer savings might have been as high as $300 million in 1991 if producers 
had been required to jointly insure all separately insured tracts of land. 
  
4 It is expected that the LCR's of larger jointly insured multiple unit farms would be smaller than if the units 
were insured independently as optional units (see Kuhling). However, both Knight and Coble and Kuhling 
found higher LCR's for individual optionally insured units as contrasted to the LCR's of similar sized basic 
units insured by smaller producers. The reasons why LCR's of individual optional units should be higher 
than the LCR's of similar smaller farm basic units are not clear.  One possibility is that some optional unit 
farms are abusing optional unit provisions. If the RMA increases premium charges sufficiently to cover the 
average cost of yield switching or other abuses of optional unit provisions, one might argue that the 
problem has been adequately addressed.  However such an argument ignores two important issues.  The 
first is that fraud increases premiums for all honest producers. Thus honest producers who desire to 
separately insure their units are forced to subsidize dishonest producers through higher premiums.  The 
second issue is that the higher optional unit premiums receive public subsidization at the same rate as 
producers who insure under a single ownership structure.       
 
5 The proportion K is selected at the beginning of the year and is common across all U units. 
 
6 The producer may commit a different type of fraud by hiding production from the adjustor. Identifying 
this type of fraud in beyond the scope of this paper.  This paper examines the potential to enhance 
indemnifications by the manipulation of the manner in which total reported production ( uu, t a y
u ￿ ) is 
reported.  All following discussions involve attempting to identify whether certain patterns in reported 
yields , ut y  are consistent with yield switching.  
 
7 If the producer reports all production to the agency, z u,t is the realized per acre yield from unit u in year t. 
If the producer hides production from the adjuster (see footnote 6), z u,t is the amount of production from 
unit u that is included in the total reported production.   
 
8 Atwood, Watts and Shaik term this practice “yield switching”.  Discussions with producers indicate that 
production is sometimes physically shifted between storage facilities on different tracts of land giving rise 
to a local producer expression “bin arbitrage”. 
 
9  The simulations are available from the authors. Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) can be used to 
derive globally optimal solutions if the APH state evolution is modeled as an AR(1) process (as in 
VerCammen and van Kooten) rather than the MA(T) process. With SDP, the optimal yield switching 
policies involve switching from high to low APH units with the severity of the yield switching decreasing if 
the probability of detection or the associated fines increase with the magnitude of yield switching. 
 
10 For each state, we estimated the amount by which the average unit residual correlation decreases with the 
number of units in the farm.  This estimated reduction in correlation was incorporated  into the error 
structure. 
 
11 When we use 
2
t s  for yearly variances and  , uv s  for within-year unit covariances, we actually use 
1 () XX
- ¢S  and 
1 (y) X
- ¢S  in system (12). 
  
12 We include only U-1 restrictions since using U restrictions in (13) with the T restrictions in (8) results in 
row dependencies in the resulting R matrix. 
 
13 We included only units with four or more years of non-replicated yield data.  A number of producers 
reported four or more years of identical yields on two or more of their units.  If a unit's yields were 
replicated, only the first unit's yield data was used in the analysis.  A large number of producers did not   25
                                                                                                                                                 
report at least four years of data on any of their separately insured units.  RMA allows these producers to 
establish coverage using county-based T-yields. 
All units reporting T-yields were excluded from the analysis.     
 
14 We assume that single unit farms do not commit yield-switching fraud and use them as a “control group” 
to estimate 
2
t s in the absence of yield switching.  If there were fewer than 100 single unit farms in a given 
county, the geographically closest counties were pooled into the county’s  “county-region” until the 
“county-region” had 100 or more single unit farms. If a given county had 100 or more single unit farms, the 
county’s “county-region” consists only of the given county. 
  
 
15 The 3-stage GLS procedures involved (i) individually estimating (17) will OLS for each single unit farm 
in the county-region, (ii) pooling residuals across all single unit farms (iii) calculating 
2
t s  as the variance 
of year t residuals from the population of single unit farms reporting yields in year t, (iv) individually re-
estimating (18) with GLS for all single unit farms in the county-region, (v) pooling the GLS residuals 
across all single unit farms and re-calculating 
2
t s , and (vi) repeating steps (iv) and (v) for one additional 
stage. 
 
16 The number of years in the example has been reduced from figure 2 due to space limitations in the tables. 
 
17 The third column of yield data is derived from the second producer’s yield data and is used to illustrate a 
potential Type-I error problem with the yield-switching model. 
 
18  The GLS model is less susceptible to low yield events if such events also occurred on a sufficient 
number of single unit farms so as to influence 
2
t s .  The following procedures were developed to address 
isolated low yield events that had negligible effects upon 
2
t s .   
 
19 The Fortran code and the results from the Monte Carlo simulations are available from the authors. 
 
20 We were originally concerned with the implications of the jack-knife procedure with respect to 
restrictions (13). If restrictions (13) are satisfied over the time period of the entire sample, they will 
undoubtedly be violated in the jackknifed model when one of the years is deleted from the analysis. 
However the non-estimability status of restrictions (13) imply that the violating the restrictions does not 
affect the jackknifed model's SSE. Tests on the additional hypothesis restrictions that all jack-knifed 
, ˆ
ut D estimates are simultaneously equal to zero are not affected by the underlying data's violation of (13). 
 
21  The J-MAX "critical value" of 0.10 used in this paper is a level that gave acceptable Type I - Type 
II error rates in the Monte Carlo simulations.  The "critical value" for J-MAX is a statistic and should 
not be interpreted as a traditional p-value. 
     
22 Governmental subsidy policies complicate coverage election regression tests due to their distorting 
effects upon producer coverage elections.  For the 1998 crop year, proportional subsidies were highest at 
the 65 percent coverage election and the majority of insured producers elected 65 percent coverage. The 
presence of different proportional subsidies by coverage level is likely to introduce “stickiness” in producer 
coverage choices thus reducing measurable producer responses as predicted by Rothschild-Stiglitz type 
models.    
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Figure 3: Example Plots of Farms With Small J-MAX ValuesTABLE 1 : YIELD DATA, SIGMA MATRIX, SSE, LRT STATISTICS AND P-VALUES FOR EXAMPLE FARMS
COUNTY SIGMA MATRIX 
      FARM YIELDS (100 POUNDS) YIELDS     UNIT-YR
UNIT-YR FARM1 FARM2 FARM3 (100 POUNDS) 1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4
1-1 6.1 3.8 3.8 5   1.45 0 0 0 0.58 0 0 0
1-2 9.9 6.9 2.5 6.3   0 1.11 0 0 0 0.44 0 0
1-3 3.6 2.6 2.6 4.2   0 0 1.58 0 0 0 0.63 0
1-4 10.5 5.7 5.7 7.3   0 0 0 2.76 0 0 0 1.1
2-1 9.1 2.4 2.4 5   0.58 0 0 0 1.45 0 0 0
2-2 5 5.9 5.9 6.3   0 0.44 0 0 0 1.11 0 0
2-3 9.1 0.4 0.4 4.2   0 0 0.63 0 0 0 1.58 0
2-4 4.4 6.2 6.2 7.3   0 0 0 1.1 0 0 0 2.76
NSW MODEL(18) SW MODEL (14-16)  
         SCALED SSE          SCALED SSE LRT STATISTIC LRT P-VALUES
YEARS FARM1 FARM2 FARM3 FARM1 FARM2 FARM3 FARM1 FARM2 FARM3 FARM1 FARM2 FARM3
EXCLUDED
FULL SAMPLE LRT RESULTS
NONE
 a 51.24 8.57 13.56 4.57 6.32 2.16 46.67 2.25 11.4 0.000 0.522 0.010
JACK KNIFE TEST RESULTS
     
        1 
b 36.76 7.38 10.66   2.45 5.32 2.13 34.31 2.06 8.53 0.000 0.357 0.014
2 34.98 4.35 4.35   4.05 2.13 2.13 30.93 2.22 2.22 0.000 0.330 0.330
3 24.79 3.69 7.56   3.39 2.71 0.58 21.4 0.98 6.98 0.000 0.613 0.031
4 41.45 7.27 12.53   2.53 6.31 1.18 38.92 0.96 11.35 0.000 0.619 0.003
J-MAX  = 0.000 0.619 0.330
 
a
 STATISTICS IN THIS ROW HAVE (8-2-4+1) OR 3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM
b
 STATISTICS WITH YEARS 1, 2, 3, OR 4 DELETED  HAVE (6-2-3+1) OR 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM            TABLE 2:  SUMMARY RESULTS OF APPLYING THE STATISTICAL MODEL TO PRODUCERS OF
                                                           BARLEY, COTTON, GRAIN SORGHUM, AND CORN
 
TOTAL # FARMS # FARMS PROPORTION       REGRESS                ESTIMATED PROPORTION
# 1% LRT J-MAX 10% PVALMAX        CVG ON                  YLD SWITCHING OF 
STATE FARMS
 1
P-VALUE (< 0.10) FARM       J-MAX 
2




MT 609 61 39 0.064 -1.53 *** 219 0.025
ND 1800 177 88 0.049 -1.03** 1734 0.032
ALL 
4
2554 246 128 0.050 $1,975 0.026
 
COTTON
AL 526 97 72 0.137 -0.939 2268 0.029
TX 9739 972 572 0.059 -0.8471*** 2156 0.004
ALL 
4
11376 1173 693 0.061 $16,116 0.019
 
GR. SORGHUM
KS 4460 228 131 0.029 -0.48*** 321 0.013
NE 1418 61 33 0.023 -0.128 154 0.010
TX 1884 173 93 0.049 -1.37*** 0 0.000
ALL 
4
7873 478 264 0.034 $566 0.004
 
CORN
CO 767 89 43 0.056 -1.12* 1015 0.048
IA 18946 2252 1258 0.066 -1.16*** 10299 0.034
IL 11956 1182 677 0.057 -0.406*** 3876 0.041
IN 4008 367 207 0.052 -0.702** 4517 0.064
KS 2589 217 88 0.034 -0.616** 1114 0.037
MN 9046 947 394 0.044 -0.688*** 4241 0.020
MO 2091 202 120 0.057 1.61*** 1421 0.027
NE 13474 1214 490 0.036 -0.944*** 6969 0.058
OH 1975 127 52 0.026 -1.28*** 1814 0.047
TX 1163 119 55 0.047 -0.646 1563 0.012
WI 1505 163 75 0.050 -1.23*** 2512 0.050
SD 5858 464 222 0.038 -2.01*** 1253 0.019
ALL 
4
75826 7583 3800 0.050 $43,671 0.034
 
1 DUE TO SPACE LIMITATIONS THIS TABLE LISTS ONLY THOSE STATES FOR WHICH THERE WERE AT LEAST 
  500 MULTIPLE UNIT PRODUCERS WITH FOUR OR MORE YEARS OF VALID YIELD DATA.
2  
 * DENOTES 10% SIGNIFICANCE,  ** DENOTES  5% SIGNIFICANCE  AND *** DENOTES  1% SIGNIFICANCE 
3
 ESTIMATED COSTS IN $1,000 UNITS                    TABLE 3:  SUMMARY RESULTS OF APPLYING THE STATISTICAL MODEL TO PRODUCERS OF
                                                                             SOYBEANS AND WHEAT 
TOTAL # FARMS # FARMS PROPORTION       REGRESS                ESTIMATED PROPORTION
# 1% LRT J-MAX 10% PVALMAX        CVG ON                  YLD SWITCHING OF 
STATE FARMS
 1
P-VALUE (< 0.10) FARM       J-MAX 
2




IA 13618 1456 748 0.055 -0.976*** 5,006 0.056
IL 8692 858 476 0.055 -0.146 1,948 0.070
IN 3006 275 141 0.047 -1.777*** 2,291 0.093
KS 2722 163 84 0.031 -0.327 627 0.035
MN 9200 998 493 0.054 -0.804*** 5,967 0.044
MO 2601 275 157 0.060 0.448 2,285 0.063
ND 718 72 46 0.064 -1.77*** 1,005 0.043
NE 6452 489 244 0.038 -0.246 1,345 0.045
OH 2132 159 72 0.034 -0.476 1,585 0.081
SD 4988 376 169 0.034 -0.692*** 4,179 0.051
ALL 
4 55596 5266 2710 0.049 $29,774 0.053
 
WHEAT
CO 2038 118 81 0.040 -0.25 427 0.010
IL 561 39 28 0.050 0.167 581 0.034
KS 16367 1362 783 0.048 -0.126 2,971 0.015
MN 1843 178 97 0.053 -1.12** 2,397 0.016
MT 4205 352 191 0.045 -0.599** 617 0.010
ND 14085 1469 802 0.057 -0.609*** 13,804 0.049
NE 3331 188 90 0.027 -0.076 484 0.013
OH 540 39 11 0.020 -2.488*** 12 0.002
OK 3749 348 209 0.056 -1.07*** 2,810 0.023
SD 2286 187 105 0.046 -1.085*** 5,036 0.051
TX 2092 225 144 0.069 -1.333*** 0 0.000
WA 1121 84 54 0.048 -1.026* 26 0.003
ALL 
4 53727 4692 2661 0.050 $29,619 0.025
1 DUE TO SPACE LIMITATIONS THIS TABLE LISTS ONLY THOSE STATES FOR WHICH THERE WERE AT LEAST   
  500 MULTIPLE UNIT PRODUCERS WITH FOUR OR MORE YEARS OF VALID YIELD DATA.
2  
 * DENOTES 10% SIGNIFICANCE,  ** DENOTES  5% SIGNIFICANCE  AND *** DENOTES  1% SIGNIFICANCE 
3
 ESTIMATED COSTS IN $1,000 UNITS
4
 THE TOTAL ROW INCLUDES THE SUMMARY RESULTS FROM ALL STATES WITH AT LEAST 100 MULTIPLE UNIT FARMS WITH VALID YIELD DATA. APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 presents the yield vectors and the X, 
-1 XX ¢S , 
-1 Xy ¢S , and R matrices from the 
example farms.  FARM 1 and FARM 2 are reported yields from two actual cotton farms 
from a county in the southeastern U.S. FARM 3 is a construct with all yields (except  1, t y  = 
2.5) set equal to those of FARM 2.  Each farm has the same X and 
-1 XX ¢S . Column 
headers GAM u, D u,t, and LAMDA j respectively denote  u g ,  u,t D , and  j l  from the main 
text. 
Table A2 presents the LAUG










The lower section of table A2 lists the right-hand-side (RHS) vectors of the restricted 
normal equations ( (
-1 Xy ¢S ) appended with  R d  from restrictions  R R= bd) and the 
corresponding solution vectors for each farm.  The solution vectors are computed as:  
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For the main body’s yield switching tests (the lower left section of Table A2)  R d  = 0.  
 
The lower right section of table A2 demonstrates that changing the RHS of the non-
estimable restriction (r5) from 0 to 5 changes the estimates of  ˆu g  and  ,
ˆ
ut D  but does not 
affect the lagrangians  ˆ l  or the farm's SSESW  (4.57).  The non-zero lagrangians associated 
with restrictions r1-r4 indicate that changing any one or more of the first four 
j
R d  values in 
R d  may affect SSESW.  Below we briefly present results indicating that each the first four restrictions in R can be expressed as a linear combination of a basis set of three linearly 
independent estimable functions and one non-estimable function.  As such, the basis set for 
the estimable restrictions implied by R is of rank three.     
Since changing the RHS on restriction (r5) changes individual  ˆu g  and  ,
ˆ
ut D  
estimates and does not change the predicted  ˆ y vector, we cannot have confidence in 
individual  ,
ˆ
ut D  estimates unless we have sufficient external evidence to believe the original 
summing-across-years restriction is true.  As we have no such evidence for any farm in our 
data set, individual  ,
ˆ
ut D  remain non-estimable. However, this does not prevent us from 
testing whether the complete set of  ,
ˆ
ut D  estimates are simultaneously zero (i.e. there is no 
yield switching on the farm).     
Results available from the authors demonstrate that G22 contains a significant 
amount of information with respect to the estimability status of the restrictions in R.  These 
results include: (i) even if the LAUG matrix is singular, a full row rank R implies 22 G  is 
symmetric and invariant for all generalized inverses of LAUG, (ii) if any row in 22 G  is 
zero, the corresponding lagrangian is zero and it's corresponding restriction is system non -
estimable, and (iii) the rank of  22 G  equals the rank of a basis set for the estimable 
restriction space implied by R. The dimension less the rank of  22 G  equals the number of 
implicitly non -estimable restrictions in R.   
In this example, the rank of the 5x5 matrix  22 G  is 3 implying that there are three 
intrinsically estimable and two intrinsically non -estimable restrictions in R.  The number of 
intrinsically estimable restrictions for the main body’s system (14)-(16) can be shown to equal T-1.  In the following we denote  22 G  from the partially restricted system (14)-(16) as 
0
22 G . 
  Testing the hypothesis that a farm is not yield switching involves testing whether all 
,
ˆ
ut D  simultaneously equal zero.  This can be accomplished with several methods. One 
method is to explicitly exclude all  ,
ˆ
ut D  from the regression (the main body’s expression 
(18)). A second, less numerically stable procedure is to construct a larger LAUG system 
with each  ,
ˆ
ut D  explicitly restricted to zero.  Although we do not recommend this method in 
practice, it has useful analytical properties.  The  22 G matrix of the larger LAUG system, 
denoted 
*
22 G , can be shown to be of rank U T – U  (8-2 or 6 in the example). The 
appropriate degrees of freedom for the LRT tests can be shown to equal the difference in 
the ranks of 
*
22 G and 
0
22 G  or UT  - U - T +1. For this example, the degrees of freedom are (8 
– 2 – 4 + 1) or 3.  
Other results when additional hypothesis testing restrictions are imposed on a 
partially restricted LAUG system are available from the authors.       
 
                             TABLE A1: DATA AND DESIGN MATRICES FOR THE EXAMPLE FARMS
DESIGN MATRIX FARM YIELDS
UNIT-YR GAM1 GAM2 D11 D12 D13 D14 D21 D22 D23 D24 FARM1 FARM2 FARM3
1-1 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.1 3.8 3.8
1-2 6.3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.9 6.9 2.5
1-3 4.2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.6 2.6 2.6
1-4 7.3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 10.5 5.7 5.7
2-1 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9.1 2.4 2.4
2-2 0 6.3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 5.9 5.9
2-3 0 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 9.1 0.4 0.4
2-4 0 7.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4.4 6.2 6.2
 
X'*SIGINV*X X'*SIGINV*Y
GAM1 GAM2 D11 D12 D13 D14 D21 D22 D23 D24 FARM1 FARM2 FARM3
99.177 -39.468 4.105 6.734 3.161 3.144 -1.642 -2.669 -1.260 -1.253 90.828 60.240 30.611
-39.468 99.177 -1.642 -2.669 -1.260 -1.253 4.105 6.734 3.161 3.144 59.486 35.263 47.008
4.105 -1.642 0.821 0 0 0 -0.328 0 0 0 2.020 2.332 2.332
6.734 -2.669 0 1.069 0 0 0 -0.424 0 0 8.463 4.875 0.172
3.161 -1.260 0 0 0.753 0 0 0 -0.300 0 -0.021 1.837 1.837
3.144 -1.253 0 0 0 0.431 0 0 0 -0.172 3.767 1.391 1.391
-1.642 4.105 -0.328 0 0 0 0.821 0 0 0 5.468 0.722 0.722
-2.669 6.734 0 -0.424 0 0 0 1.069 0 0 1.150 3.383 5.247
-1.260 3.161 0 0 -0.300 0 0 0 0.753 0 5.768 -0.479 -0.479
-1.253 3.144 0 0 0 -0.172 0 0 0 0.431 0.093 1.692 1.692
RESTRICTION R MATRIX
NUMBER GAM1 GAM2 D11 D12 D13 D14 D21 D22 D23 D24      RESTRICTIONS RHS
r1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
r2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
r3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
r4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
r5 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0                   TABLE A2: LAUG-INVERSE MATRIX AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE EXAMPLE FARMS
LAUG-INVERSE MATRIX
G11 G12
GAM1 GAM2 D11 D12 D13 D14 D21 D22 D23 D24 LAMDA1  LAMDA2 LAMDA3 LAMDA4 LAMDA5
0.012 0.004 -0.001 -0.01 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.01 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.012 0.006 0.006 -0.044
0.004 0.012 0.001 0.01 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.01 0.004 0.007 -0.043 -0.056 -0.038 -0.038 0.044
-0.001 0.001 0.344 -0.068 -0.1 -0.176 -0.344 0.068 0.1 0.176 0.39 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.219
-0.01 0.01 -0.068 0.308 -0.087 -0.153 0.068 -0.308 0.087 0.153 -0.138 0.362 -0.138 -0.138 0.276
0.004 -0.004 -0.1 -0.087 0.37 -0.183 0.1 0.087 -0.37 0.183 -0.092 -0.092 0.408 -0.092 0.184
0.007 -0.007 -0.176 -0.153 -0.183 0.511 0.176 0.153 0.183 -0.511 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0.34 0.32
0.001 -0.001 -0.344 0.068 0.1 0.176 0.344 -0.068 -0.1 -0.176 0.61 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.219
0.01 -0.01 0.068 -0.308 0.087 0.153 -0.068 0.308 -0.087 -0.153 0.138 0.638 0.138 0.138 -0.276
-0.004 0.004 0.1 0.087 -0.37 0.183 -0.1 -0.087 0.37 -0.183 0.092 0.092 0.592 0.092 -0.184
-0.007 0.007 0.176 0.153 0.183 -0.511 -0.176 -0.153 -0.183 0.511 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.66 -0.32
0.001 -0.043 0.39 -0.138 -0.092 -0.16 0.61 0.138 0.092 0.16 -0.196 0.084 0.039 0.039 0
-0.012 -0.056 -0.11 0.362 -0.092 -0.16 0.11 0.638 0.092 0.16 0.084 -0.184 0.065 0.064 0
0.006 -0.038 -0.11 -0.138 0.408 -0.16 0.11 0.138 0.592 0.16 0.039 0.065 -0.196 0.03 0
0.006 -0.038 -0.11 -0.138 -0.092 0.34 0.11 0.138 0.092 0.66 0.039 0.064 0.03 -0.1 0
-0.044 0.044 0.219 0.276 0.184 0.32 -0.219 -0.276 -0.184 -0.32 0 0 0 0 0
G21 G22
GLS NORMAL EQUATION  RHS VALUES AND RESULTS RESTRICTIONS (15 & 16) EFFECT OF CHANGING RHS ON EQ (16)
X'*EPSINV*Y SOLUTION VECTORS X'*EPSINV*Y SOLUTION
FARM1 FARM2 FARM3 FARM1 FARM2 FARM3 FARM1 FARM1
90.828 60.240 30.611 GAM1 1.31 0.89 0.64 90.828 GAM1 1.09
59.486 35.263 47.008 GAM2 1.2 0.71 0.66 59.486 GAM2 1.42
2.020 2.332 2.332 D11 -1.77 0.25 0.73 2.020 D11 -0.68
8.463 4.875 0.172 D12 2.1 -0.07 -1.66 8.463 D12 3.49
-0.021 1.837 1.837 D13 -2.98 0.72 1.13 -0.021 D13 -2.06
3.767 1.391 1.391 D14 2.65 -0.91 -0.2 3.767 D14 4.25
5.468 0.722 0.722 D21 1.77 -0.25 -0.73 5.468 D21 0.68
1.150 3.383 5.247 D22 -2.1 0.07 1.66 1.150 D22 -3.49
5.768 -0.479 -0.479 D23 2.98 -0.72 -1.13 5.768 D23 2.06
0.093 1.692 1.692 D24 -2.65 0.91 0.2 0.093 D24 -4.25
r1 0.000 0.000 0.000 LAMDA1  0.64 -0.44 -0.07 0.000 LAMDA1  0.64
r2 0.000 0.000 0.000 LAMDA2 -0.31 0.88 0.07 0.000 LAMDA2 -0.31
r3 0.000 0.000 0.000 LAMDA3 0.48 -0.84 -0.56 0.000 LAMDA3 0.48
r4 0.000 0.000 0.000 LAMDA4 -0.45 0.03 0.31 0.000 LAMDA4 -0.45
r5 0.000 0.000 0.000 LAMDA5 0 0 0 5.000 LAMDA5 0
SSE-SW 4.57 6.32 2.16 SSE-SW 4.57References 
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